The Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The outer space treaty is the oldest, with 110 signatories. Therefore, in public international law, there are many ways to claim sovereignty, occupation, use and possession. Therefore, the moon agreement excludes the application of this principle to repeat that this is related to the outer space treaty. The past few decades have witnessed the biggest changes in space establishment since the Cold War.
Between Sputnik 1 and SpaceX Falcon 9, we've seen more nations establish their own defensive space commands, diversify their space technologies, and even demonstrate potentially destructive capabilities for the world to see. However, to understand the future ahead, we must consider the state of space governance now. We then describe the current legal systems, which collectively constitute the global spatial governance system, while identifying and critically explaining the shortcomings within those systems. In doing so, we will show possible paths to stronger global space governance to ensure the security and sustainability of space for the future future.
Global space governance was born out of the Cold War era, where only a few actors, namely the United States (U.S. UU. In today's world, however, 72 nations claim to have space agencies and 14 are capable of performing orbital launches. Unfortunately, this means that low- to middle-income countries have been largely excluded from writing the rules that are still in place more than half a century later.
In addition, the five founding organizations of the United Nations (UN,. However, with the rapid pace of space development, the future of space governance will need to encompass additional threats caused by novel changes in the world order. This will prove to be a delicate, if not deceptive, balancing act between encouraging democratization, boosting commercialization and containing militarization. For more than half a century, the UN,.
He has been the main facilitator of global space law and governance. The Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) was established to support Governments in building legal, technical and political infrastructure to support global space activities. In addition to helping states understand space law and develop their own national space policy in line with the established global governance framework, UNOOSA maintains a register of objects launched into outer space and plays an essential role in forming additional international organizations to address specific problem areas of spatial regulation. COPUOS and its 95 member States discuss topics such as the regulation of space debris, the extraction of space resources, the standardization of small satellites such as CubeSats, the nuclearization of outer space and the threats posed by asteroids and other types of space rocks, among other areas that require and space law with purpose.
These activities are divided between the two subcommittees of the Committee, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee, and meet annually to discuss issues related to major space treaties and international mechanisms for space cooperation. Do you want to learn more about the history of the space race with first-hand resources? Visit the Wilson Center Space Race Digital Archive, which houses documents on the 20th century competition for supremacy in space flight capability between the United States and the Soviet Union. To supplement these gaps, four additional treaties were created, but to a large extent they did not succeed in garnering sufficient support and mitigating the shortcomings of their predecessors. Expanding Articles 5 and 8 of the OST, the second U, N.
The space treaty “The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched to Outer Space”, called the Rescue Agreement (196), states that States must take measures to rescue and assist astronauts in the event of an accident, danger or emergency landing and return to their launch state, in addition to helping launch states recover space objects returning to Earth outside the native launch state. Despite the fact that the Rescue Agreement is clear as to the status of astronauts as “envoys of humanity”, there has not yet been an opportunity for other States to test the effectiveness of the Agreement or to help an astronaut in distress when a state's astronauts or cosmonauts were in danger. The space treaty, “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects”, called the Liability Convention (197), describes the liability of launching States for damage caused by their space objects, both on Earth and in space, as well as the procedures for resolving claims for damages suffered. This means that states are still responsible for any space assets launched from their territory, which implies that the same states are responsible for any damage in the event of an accident.
Under the Liability Convention, claims for damage or destruction are brought by a State against a State, regardless of who caused the incident, whether it is a commercial actor or a state space agency. Under most domestic legal instruments, an individual or industry could initiate a lawsuit against another person or industry, but with respect to international space law, the Liability Convention determined that States are ultimately responsible, even if an incident is caused by an actor. The Liability Convention has only been invoked once, in 1978, when the USSR Cosmos 954 satellite accidentally re-entered the Earth's atmosphere, dispersing about 50 kg of radioactive uranium-235 over northern Canada. Although this area was sparsely populated, several residents were accidentally exposed to radiation before a major recovery campaign succeeded in sweeping a total area of 124,000 square kilometers in the course of almost a year (Karacalıoğlu, 201. The fifth treaty, “The Agreement Governing the Activities of States in the Moon and other celestial bodies, known as the Moon Treaty (198), have received the least support from member nations for their reaffirmation and elaboration of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty in the context of the appropriation and exploration of the Moon and the exploitation of its resources.
The Moon Treaty states that the Moon shall be used by all states “exclusively for peaceful purposes”, and that “(A), any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act on the Moon is prohibited. In addition, it prohibits the placement or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the Moon, as well as the “establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers (U, N. Following the ratification of the five United Nations,. Fundamental space treaties, with much or little support, the international space law community shifted to the development of voluntary consensus principles and guidelines for space operations, debris mitigation and space sustainability.
In addition to the five general multilateral treaties, the UN,. He oversaw the drafting and formulation of five sets of principles adopted by the General Assembly, including the Declaration of Legal Principles. While these influential voluntary international guidelines may contain more detailed, challenging and aspirational objectives, they are not binding. In addition to the “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space”, the four additional statements were: Apart from UNOOSA and UNCOPUOS and their mechanisms, another forum dedicated to discussing and negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements, is the Conference of Disarm (CD).
Organization, is connected to the U, N. Through a personal representative of the UN,. Secretary General and considers the recommendations of the UNGA, as well as the proposals of its members. The Conference on Disarmament is responsible for successfully negotiating a number of non-proliferation treaties, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
The Conference on Disarmament has a broad mandate that encompasses, inter alia, the negotiation and discussion of the “cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; the prevention of nuclear war; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against threat of use of nuclear weapons and new types of weapons of mass destruction. However, due to the impasse in member States, there have been insufficient substantive discussions and debates on critical measures such as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and nuclear disarmament. Binding national governance and enforcement mechanisms promote space security in accordance with each state's unique interpretation of international law of common space, accepted best practices and expected standards of conduct. However, disparities in interpretations by each state can lead space operators to adopt “flags of convenience”, either to avoid costly analysis, designs or operational mandates, or to circumvent stricter regulations.
As a result, space operators and the commercial industry tend to favor non-binding industry best practices and self-government. Image CreditWilson Center's Across Karman Project In an era when space evolves and develops more rapidly than intergovernmental organizations can sustain, it is very clear that the current framework of global space governance, a product of the Cold War, is no longer adequate. As it stands, the global space governance framework excludes many space activities and allows actors to operate under broad and often conflicting interpretations of existing agreements. While there have been many attempts to improve the governance framework, progress in this area has stalled, largely due to diplomatic stagnations among international actors, and has had a negative impact on the sustainable development of space.
Of the five international agreements mentioned above, the Outer Space Treaty (196), the Rescue Agreement (196), the Liability Convention (197) and the Registration Conventions (197) require substantial clarification in order to apply many of their principles to emerging space activities and issues, like satellites. maintenance, space traffic management, tourism or space debris mitigation. The Moon Treaty (197) has too few signatories to be fully effective. While countries have tried to improve or complement these agreements over the years, there have been no new multilateral agreements since the 1970s.
Instead, non-binding rules have emerged largely because of the ease with which they can be created and enforced, however effective or ineffective they may be. Often slow to act, limited in authority and stuck by political stalemate, international organizations such as COPUOS and, more indirectly, UNOOSA, which were created to advance global space governance, are failing to advance their mission. While this has not deterred nations with space programmes from proposing new multilateral policies that address changing uses of space through international forums, important technological advances, such as the rapid advancement of the commercial space sector, are often overlooked. This gives rise to concern, especially since private entities are not bound by the Outer Space Treaty or by any of the other agreements.
Another noteworthy obstacle is that different States have different priorities when it comes to transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs), and often competing economic and military interests tend to stall such efforts. As our dependence on space increases, what are the implications for global critical infrastructure? Do risks to space capabilities threaten global economic development and international security? Former NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine and Aerospace Corporation experts discuss the future of space governance at this event organized at the Wilson Center. In response to recent failures in promoting international agreements, the development of national space policies is on the increase. Take the U.S.
These documents cover our human space exploration program (SPD-); commercial space regulations (SPD-); national space traffic management (SPD-); the creation of the Space Force (SPD-); cybersecurity in space (SPD-); and space nuclear energy and propulsion (SPD-. With the addition of the U.S. The growth of the commercial space sector has proven to be the only space-related development since the foundations of international space governance were laid in the 1960s and 1970s. This has greatly contributed to trade interests being given a higher priority as new national policies are developed.
While they are given lower priority than national security (that is,. The preference for developing national policies rather than international agreements reflects both the emerging value of commercial space and the stagnation of international space governance. And Russia distinguishes itself from other nations, as they have the strongest set of national laws and regulatory organizations designed with international space commitments in mind. However, among the 28 nations with national space policies, there is little policy convergence.
States' decisions to develop unilateral space policies, with little concern for international cooperation, are creating more constraints than benefits. Lack of cooperation only aggravates existing political confusion and slows down the development of commercial space activities. Notable examples include satellite service operations and space traffic management, which have significant economic value but cannot be fully developed without better cooperation because of their need for shared standards and best practices, just as civil aviation could not function. effectively if states did not agree on standards and best practices for air traffic control or flight safety.
As global commons, if the objective is to take full advantage of the economic value of near-Earth space, then unilateral national policies cannot replace international agreements. Current trends suggest that the number of space actors and their interests will increase in the coming years. Consequently, competition for the use of space is likely to widen and intensify, with more actors pursuing their interests and disagreements becoming more common. Current international space governance will not be able to manage the changing nature of space development.
A new governance is needed, structured differently. Undoubtedly, space has undergone some significant changes since the turn of the century, and so has its threat landscape. Although space was once seen as a peaceful sanctuary for scientific purposes, it has become the new playing field for major power competition between the U.S. In addition to the superpowers, there are now a greater number of nations and non-state actors involved in space activities, and the role of commercial actors in space is increasingly considerable.
While the privatization of space has so far proven to be primarily a Western phenomenon, nations around the world are beginning to adopt the public-private partnership model and will follow its example. As such, since an increasingly democratized and more accessible space will inevitably bring more man-made threats and challenges to space sustainability, it will be necessary to strengthen the current system of space governance to effectively address the challenges of the near future. The process of developing new rules for movement in space has been complicated by the rapid proliferation of space technology among new actors. Throughout the Cold War era, when technology was in the hands of few states, reaching consensus on treaties was much easier due to the shared interest of the permanent members of the UN,.
The Security Council will monitor the diffusion of technology. Today, the same technologies that were in the hands of a select few are in the hands of dozens of countries. As such, there is less incentive to collaborate in modifying or updating Cold War-era provisions, which has led to a stalemate in international bodies originally established to promote global space governance. In the absence of a multilateral consensus on the management of space activities through intergovernmental organizations, namely, the United Nations,.
UNOOSA, UNCOPUOS and CD), non-State actors have played an increasingly influential role in the development of space law. Currently, the international regime of space law grants legal authority to regulate and manage space activities to nation-States, not international organizations, through Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. International agencies, such as UNCOPUOS, play a key role in standard-setting and facilitating coordination, but licensing and enforcement are carried out at the national level. The successful contributions of non-state actors to global space governance are directly correlated with the broader trend of a tense multilateral order in which international rules, standards and voluntary (or non-binding) agreements are preferred over legally binding treaties.
The declining capacity of intergovernmental organizations to create widely accepted treaties and agreements that effectively manage space activities means, therefore, that non-space nations are losing what little access they already had to shape space governance. It is therefore not surprising that successful governance through the model of space law, legally binding and verifiable measures, has become impossible to achieve in the current international political climate. Today, States have shifted their focus to standard-setting through voluntary and non-legal measures with the goal of achieving mutual understanding and reducing suspicion, competition and rivalry between states, bypassing international legal bodies altogether. For space governance to continue to succeed, states must think about modern challenges creatively and collaboratively in the long term, strictly bilateral agreements, national policies and passive support for non-binding agreements will not be enough.
It is important to note that ineffective and outdated multilateral treaties and agreements are not exclusive obstacles to global space governance alone, but rather to global governance and multilateralism in general. To stay ahead of adversaries, especially in the context of LEO's rapid development, the U.S. It must aspire to lead the creation of new space governance policies, focusing on the creation of effective and functionally specific bilateral agreements between like-minded allies and partners. The path to the development of new traffic rules for space activities, taking into account space sustainability, involves partnering with allies and partners, and would serve to overcome the current stalemate in COPUOS.
It is also important to note that, historically, bilateral agreements between major countries have influenced the broader behavior of global governance. An enabling environment for formal, standards-based international collaboration is space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM). The new agreements on SSA and STM would allow greater transparency in the activities of different actors in space and would further reduce concerns about dual-use technologies, make in-orbit operations more precise and alleviate concerns related to orbital debris management. In addition, it is essential that best practices and traffic management regulations are initiated to prevent incidents in space.
UU. And several countries and business players are currently participating in SSA cooperation through memorandums of understanding, an increasing amount of space activity is testing the Department of Defense's ability to provide secure and actionable data. More Formal Cooperation Between the U.S. And its allies and partners are needed, possibly through the support of COPUOS.
Another key challenge that would benefit from formal, standards-based international collaboration is space debris mitigation. New space debris mitigation agreements should follow the guidelines of existing guidelines of major space agencies, such as the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and should be adapted and formalized as official treaties and be enforced through regulations. Importantly, the full value of space cannot be realized if the challenges posed by space debris are not addressed at the level of binding agreements, which would legally oblige States to comply with mutually agreed standards. Of the many challenges facing global space governance, increasing space debris, overcrowded orbits, radio frequency interference, issues of spectrum allocation and the development of antispace capabilities, none can be addressed without re-establishing intergovernmental bodies with the capacity to develop an effective outer space regime.
Outdated provisions whose definitions and vague language are left to the interpretation of states should be reviewed and new rules for participation should be developed. Despite all political obstacles, decision leaders must prioritize the development of effective international space law, first and foremost by committing to strengthening international dialogues, encouraging openness, greater transparency and information exchange, and avoiding pushing national agendas rather than ensure that space remains a world heritage. For the current status of international agreements related to outer space activities, visit the U. Status of international agreements relating to outer space activities of the Office for Outer Space Affairs.
The Science and Technology Innovation Program (STIP) takes forecasting to the frontier. Our experts explore emerging technologies through vital conversations, making science policy accessible to all. Read More One Woodrow Wilson Plaza1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NarrativaTreaty TextList of signatories The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, was the second of the so-called non-arms treaties; its concepts and some of its provisions were inspired by its predecessor, the Antarctic Treaty.
Like that Treaty, it sought to avoid a new form of colonial competition and the possible damage that selfish exploitation could cause. Between 1959 and 1962, Western powers made a series of proposals to ban the use of outer space for military purposes. His successive plans for general and complete disarmament included provisions to prohibit the orbit and deployment in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty apply to outer space and celestial bodies.
Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and 1962 included provisions to ensure the peaceful use of outer space. However, the Soviet Union would not separate outer space from other disarmament issues, nor would it agree to limit outer space to peaceful uses unless the United States,. Foreign bases where short- and medium-range missiles were stationed were also eliminated. Western powers refused to accept the Soviet approach; the link, they argued, would alter the military balance and weaken the security of the West.
After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the position of the Soviet Union changed. It stopped linking an agreement on outer space to the question of foreign bases. On 19 September 1963, Foreign Minister Gromyko told the General Assembly that the Soviet Union wanted to conclude an agreement banning the orbit of objects carrying nuclear weapons. Ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States had no intention of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them in celestial bodies, or parking them in outer space.
The General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on 17 October 1963, in which it welcomed the Soviet and the United States. Declarations and call on all States to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space. The United States supported the resolution, despite the absence of verification provisions; the capabilities of its space tracking systems were considered sufficient to detect launches and devices in orbit. In order to maintain the momentum of arms control agreements, the United States in 1965 and 1966 lobbied for the establishment of a treaty that would give greater substance to the United Nations,.
On 16 June 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted draft treaties. The project dealt only with celestial bodies; the Soviet project covered the entire environment of outer space. The United States accepted the Soviet position on the scope of the Treaty, and by September agreement had already been reached in discussions in Geneva on most of the provisions of the Treaty. Differences on the few outstanding issues, mainly related to access to facilities in celestial bodies, reporting on space activities and the use of military equipment and personnel in space exploration, were successfully resolved in private consultations during the period of General Assembly sessions in December.
First of all, it contains a commitment not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the Moon or any other celestial body, or any other station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapon of mass destruction. Second, it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use to establish military bases, installations or fortifications; test weapons of any kind; or perform military maneuvers. Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, 27 January 1967 Ratification advised by the United States,. Senate April 25, 1967 Ratified by U.S.
Ratification deposited in Washington, London and Moscow on October 10, 1967 Proclaimed by U.S. President 10 October 1967 Entry into force on 10 October 1967 The States Parties to this Treaty, inspired by the great prospects opened before humanity as a result of the entry of man into outer space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all peoples, regardless of the degree of their economic or scientific development, Desiring to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific and legal aspects of exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, Believing that such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963, Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), which calls upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any object carrying nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction or the installation of such weapons in celestial bodies, which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 October 1963, Taking into account resolution 110 (II) of the United Nations General Assembly of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda intended or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the above-mentioned resolution applies to outer space, Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of outer space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, will promote the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, will be carried out for the benefit and interest of all countries, regardless of their degree of economy or science development, and will be the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free from exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on an equal footing and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
There will be freedom of scientific research in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and States will facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such research. Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, through use or occupation, or by any other means. States Parties to the Treaty shall undertake activities for the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting cooperation and understanding international. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any object carrying nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction, to install such weapons in celestial bodies, or to park such weapons in outer space in any other way.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the performance of military maneuvers on celestial bodies is prohibited. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose shall not be prohibited. Nor will the use of any equipment or facilities necessary for the peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies be prohibited.
States Parties to the Treaty shall consider astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall provide them with all possible assistance in the event of an accident, danger or emergency landing in the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they will be returned safely and promptly to the State of registration of their spacecraft. In carrying out activities in outer space and in celestial bodies, astronauts from one State Party shall provide all possible assistance to astronauts from other States Parties. States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomenon they discover in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which may constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.
States Parties to the Treaty shall assume international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried out by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities, and for ensuring that national activities are carried out carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require the authorization and ongoing supervision of the State Party concerned to the Treaty. When an international organization carries out activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be assumed by both the international organization and the States Parties to the Treaty participating in that organization. Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or promotes the launch of an object into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or legal persons for such object or its component parts on Earth, in airspace or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.
The State Party to the Treaty in whose register an object launched into outer space is kept shall retain jurisdiction and control over that object, and especially its personnel, while in outer space or in a celestial body. The ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects launched or constructed in a celestial body, and their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or in a celestial body or by their return to Earth. Objects or component parts that are beyond the boundaries of the State Party to the Treaty in whose register they are registered shall be returned to that State Party, which, upon request, shall provide identification data prior to their return. In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall carry out all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to corresponding interests of all other States parties to the Treaty.
States Parties to the Treaty shall conduct studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and shall conduct their exploration in order to avoid harmful pollution and also adverse changes in the Earth's environment as a result of the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, could cause potentially harmful interference with the activities of other States Parties in peaceful exploration and use of space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, will conduct appropriate international consultations before proceeding to any such activity or experiment. A State party to the Treaty that has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, could cause potentially harmful interference with activities for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, can request inquiries about the activity or experiment. In order to promote international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with the purposes of this Treaty, States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on an equal footing any request by other States Parties to the Treaty to be provided opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States.
The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be offered shall be determined by agreement among the States concerned. In order to promote international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, States parties to the Treaty engaged in outer space activities, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as the public and to the international scientific community, to the greatest extent practicable and practicable, of the nature, conduct, location and results of such activities. Upon receiving such information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations must be willing to disseminate it immediately and effectively. All stations, facilities, equipment and spacecraft on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on the basis of reciprocity.
Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of the planned visit, so that appropriate consultations can take place and that maximum precautions can be taken to ensure safety and avoid interference with normal operations at the facility to be visited. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, irrespective of whether such activities are carried out by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried out within the framework of international intergovernmental organizations. The States Parties to the Treaty shall resolve any practical question arising in connection with the activities of international intergovernmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with the relevant organization or with one or more States members of that international organization who are Parties to this Treaty. Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty.
Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty that accepts them after acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and, thereafter, for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of its acceptance by the Treaty. This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Depositary Governments shall transmit duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, sign this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, in the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, on January 27, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven. Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of (Aden). The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Scientific, Technical and Legal Subcommittees operate on the basis of consensus,. The Soviet Union, however, would not separate outer space from other disarmament issues, nor would it agree to restrict outer space to peaceful uses unless U.
Jakhu, is the McGill Handbook on International Law Applicable to the Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS Project), which aims to clarify existing rules of international law with regard to the military uses of outer space. Since the Cold War, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) and the International Telecommunication Union have served as a constitutional legal framework and set of principles and procedures that constitute space law. Many space nations seem to believe that discussing a new space agreement or an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty would be futile and time-consuming, because deep-rooted differences in resource appropriation, property rights and other issues related to commercial activity make consensus unlikely. .
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